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The paper analyses patterns in spatial proximity between venture capital investors and 
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PATTERNS IN SPATIAL PROXIMITY BETWEEN  
VENTURE CAPITAL INVESTORS AND INVESTEES IN GERMANY 
- An Empirical Analysis – 
1  Introduction 
The role of venture capital for regional development is widely discussed in theory and 
practice (Florida/Kenney (1988); Mason/Harrison (2002); Achleitner et al. (2009)). As 
venture capital investors provide financing to young, high risk and high growth compa-
nies, venture capital plays a vital role in alleviating economic growth (Samila/Sorenson 
(2008)). Furthermore, venture capitalists are found to accelerate innovative output in 
their portfolio companies (Kortum/Lerner (2000)). In addition to this direct effect, the 
venture capital market also has a positive indirect effect on economic renewal through 
spill-over effects of the R&D activities in the ventures they nurture (Jaffe (1986); 
Audretsch/Feldman (1996)). In this context, the importance of spatial proximity be-
tween venture capitalists and their portfolio companies is a relevant topic as it can ex-
plain the importance of locally established venture capital firms for a region. 
Informational asymmetries as well as transaction costs are expected to be less pro-
nounced in deals with close spatial proximity between the venture capital investor and 
the new venture. In addition, local networks can help to initiate the first contact, conduct 
the due diligence, and can be helpful in post-investment support. Empirical evidence of 
Anglo-Saxon venture capital markets such as the UK, the US or Canada underlines 
these arguments and shows that venture capital investors prefer investments in close 
geographic distances (e.g. Mason (1992); Sorenson/Stuart (2001); Cumming/Johan 
(2006)). In contrast, based on a survey of German venture capitalists Fritsch/Schilder 
(2008) found that the interviewed venture capitalists did not see spatial proximity as an 
important investment decision factor. They offer two main explanations for their diverg-
ing results compared to other studies. First, the German market is characterized with 
less pronounced spatial clustering compared to the US or the UK (Martin et al. (2002)). 
In addition, Germany has a dense travel infrastructure through a tight network of flight 
connections, train connections and highways which makes it relatively easy to reach 
nearly all locations. Second, German venture capitalists may be forced to invest in a 
more dispersed geographic location in order to find attractive investment opportunities 
because there may be a relatively lower number of such opportunities in Germany com-
pared to more mature venture capital markets. However, their findings are based on a 
small sample of German venture capitalists and the perception of venture capitalists on 
the importance of spatial proximity may differ from their actual investment behaviour.  
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We therefore set out to further investigate the particularities of the German market 
based on archival data analysis of a large sample. In analysing specific patterns in spa-
tial proximity between venture capitalists and their investees in Germany, we want to 
yield further evidence on the relevance of spatial proximity in venture capital finance 
for a continental European country. Our paper sheds light on how the likelihood of spa-
tial proximity in Germany relates to certain factors characterizing the new venture, the 
venture capitalist and the deal. Analysed factors include the development stage and in-
dustry of the new venture, as well as the size, experience, level of specialization, and 
type of the venture capitalist. Finally, round specific aspects such as the investment vol-
ume or consecutive investment rounds are analysed. In addition to these characteristics, 
we investigate differences between lead- and co-investors in regard to the found rela-
tionships. We are able to yield important new findings with our detailed analysis of the 
German market, particularly for markets in similar development stages and with a simi-
lar infrastructure as Germany. 
Important implications can be drawn from our detailed analysis of patterns in spatial 
proximity in the venture capital market. Venture capitalists can review their investment 
strategies in terms of their geographic focus in the light of their specific business model. 
Entrepreneurial teams can gain important insights on where to focus their search for 
adequate venture capitalists depending on individual characteristics of their new ven-
ture. Public policy makers can get a view on the group of new ventures for which lo-
cally established venture capital investors seem to be particularly important. Hence, 
they can evaluate what type of new ventures profit the most from policies targeting to 
build up a vital local venture capital market. 
We use a sample of 950 dyads of venture capitalists and German new ventures from 
January 2002 to March 2007 provided by Dow Jones VentureSource. For estimating 
spatial proximity between the venture capitalist and the new venture we use the mini-
mum travel time which for longer distances includes travel by plane. We are the first 
study to introduce this flight option and, therefore, we are able to project spatial prox-
imity more realistically compared to other studies. In addition, it allows us to also in-
clude foreign venture capitalists, e.g. from the US, in our analysis. 
 
2  Theoretical background and hypotheses 
The relationship between venture capital investors and investees is often investigated in 
the light of principal agent theory (e.g. Gompers (1995); Wright/Robbie (1998); 
Sapienza/De Clercq (2000); Kaplan/Strömberg (2001)) as multiple principal agent rela- 
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tionships emerge in a venture capital deal. First, the venture capitalist can be viewed as 
principal investing in a new venture in which the entrepreneurial team as agent has an 
information advantage pre- and post-investment e.g. in regard to the business model, the 
technology, the product or the service and regarding their own experience and capabili-
ties. Second, the venture capitalist can also be viewed as agent as he is expected to offer 
non-financial support through value adding activities (Sapienza (1992); Hellmann/Puri 
(2002)). This support is valuable as the venture capitalist often has accumulated indus-
try-specific knowledge through other investments which goes beyond the knowledge of 
the entrepreneurial team. The entrepreneurial team can not foresee the capabilities and 
intentions of the venture capitalist prior to closing the deal. 
In combination with information asymmetries these principal agent relationships lead to 
incentive problems which can be defined as agency costs. In order to reduce these costs, 
Jensen/Meckling) (1976) describe monitoring and bonding as two general solutions 
which can also be applied to the venture capital context. The screening and intensive 
appraisal of a potential investment through due diligence which the venture capitalist 
undertakes pre-investment can be subsumed under monitoring in a broad sense. The 
entrepreneurial team can try to assess the venture capitalist pre-investment through 
evaluating his experience and reputation build up through prior deals. 
In a narrow sense, monitoring refers to measures of control applied post-investment by 
the venture capitalist, e.g. through a seat on the board of directors, special control and 
voting rights or frequent reporting obligations of the venture (Gompers (1995); 
Kaplan/Strömberg (2001)). Bonding measures include self bonding contracts by the 
entrepreneurial team which align the interests of the venture capital investor and the 
investee (Kaplan/Strömberg (2003)). In addition, high reputation can serve as a signal 
for post-investment behaviour of the venture capitalist and the entrepreneurial team. 
Spatial proximity between the venture capitalist and the venture is likely to affect the 
measures to mitigate agency costs as described above. Pre-investment, the screening 
and due diligence process is easier and less expensive for venture capitalists if they are 
located closer to the venture. Onsite meetings and personal contacts are less difficult to 
arrange. In addition, it is less complicated to acquire information through direct or indi-
rect sources on the venture or the venture capitalist respectively if both of them are 
based in the same geographic region. Therefore, the reputation of potential partners is 
easier to assess if a personal regional network can be used. Post-investment, frequent 
visits to the venture are easier to undertake as less time is spend in transit. Therefore, 
spatial proximity facilitates monitoring in a narrow sense of the venture capitalist as the  
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direct involvement in the venture and control of the entrepreneurial team is easier to 
pursue (Sorenson/Stuart (2001)). 
Transaction cost theory uses the total transaction costs which include all costs and dis-
advantages incurred by the contracting parties in order to realize a transaction as criteria 
to evaluate alternative institutional structures or transactions (Williamson (1981)). Ac-
cordingly, a venture capital investor is going to choose the investment opportunity with 
lowest transaction costs when deciding between opportunities with identical expected 
returns. In theory, the same argument holds true for entrepreneurial teams when decid-
ing between venture capitalists with the same expected financial and non-financial sup-
port. Many of the transaction costs relevant in a venture capital deal are sensitive to the 
geographic dispersion of the involved parties. Search and information costs are expected 
to be lower if the venture capital investor and the new venture are located in the same 
area because they can use their regional network to identify and evaluate potential tar-
gets. Negotiation and decision costs occur in an iterative process prior to closing a ven-
ture capital deal whereas monitoring and enforcement costs become relevant post-
investment (Sorenson/Stuart (2001)). All of these costs incur travel and information 
expenses which are less when the venture capitalist and the new venture are in close 
spatial proximity to each other. Information expenses are likely to be higher for more 
dispersed dyads of venture capitalists and new ventures because less experience with 
local markets, regional particularities or local service providers is likely to require addi-
tional information which leads to higher labour effort or the need for support from third 
parties. Hence, it can be assumed that transaction costs decrease with closer spatial 
proximity between the venture capitalist and the venture. 
In addition, social exchange theory postulates that the likelihood and intensity of a rela-
tionship increases sharply if parties are located close to each other as the probability of a 
random encounter is higher and a reduced effort is necessary to get in contact with each 
other (Thibaut/Kelley (1959); Blau (1977)). Local personal relationships facilitate the 
transfer of information as well as tacit knowledge and build closely knit personal net-
works (McPherson et al. (2001)). Applied to the venture capital context, this implies 
that spatial proximity between the venture capital investor and investee not only facili-
tates opportunity recognition through denser local networks but also enhances value-
adding activities post-investment as the transfer of information as well as tacit knowl-
edge and the provision of local contacts is easier. 
In the light of principal agent theory, transaction cost theory and social exchange theory 
described above, we hypothesize that the likelihood of spatial proximity between ven- 
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ture capital investors and investees will be systematically related to certain characteris-
tics of the parties involved and the type of deal. These characteristics are shortly de-
scribed below and summarized in testable hypotheses. 
Development stage of the new venture 
The development stage of the new venture is likely to impact the need for a thorough 
due diligence pre-investment and for monitoring and non-financial support by the ven-
ture capitalist post-investment. Less developed companies are usually characterised by 
technological, resource or management uncertainties and, therefore, problems arising 
from informational asymmetries can be expected to be stronger than in more mature 
companies. In addition to these uncertainties, entrepreneurial teams of less mature com-
panies are likely to be less experienced and to be less complementary in their set of ca-
pabilities. Thus, it can be expected that they require more non-financial support by the 
venture capitalist compared to more mature companies (Gupta/Sapienza (1992), Powell 
et al. (2002)). Therefore, we expect that the likelihood for spatial proximity is higher for 
portfolio companies in earlier stages of development. We hypothesize: 
H1a: Likelihood for spatial proximity is higher for younger portfolio companies.  
H1b: Likelihood for spatial proximity is higher for seed investment rounds. 
H1c: Likelihood for spatial proximity is lower for later stage investment rounds. 
Industry of the new venture 
The industry of the new venture is likely to be another indicator for the level of informa-
tional asymmetries and the required level of control and non-financial support 
(Gompers (1995); Cumming/Johan (2006)). The liquidation value of assets is positively 
related to the tangibility of assets since tangible assets are easier to sell and yield a price 
closer to their book value in case of default (Williamson (1988)). Hence, a greater frac-
tion of intangible assets may be related to higher agency costs as the venture capitalist’s 
potential loss increases in case of the venture’s default or inefficient continuation. Fur-
thermore, a high R&D intensity may lead to a relatively high amount of firm specific 
assets which are more difficult to sell in case of the venture’s default compared to less 
specialised assets (Shleifer/Vishny (1992)). New ventures focussing on research and 
development may also require a higher level of non-financial support in order to focus 
and to successfully market their innovative products. Finally, entrepreneurs may be 
more prone to pursue personally beneficial investment strategies at the expense of their 
investors if the value of their venture largely depends on future growth options (Myers 
(1977)). High market to book ratios are often used as an indicator of high growth oppor-
tunities in an industry. Thus, a high R&D intensity in terms of a high ratio of R&D ex-
penses to total assets as well as high market to book ratios may indicate higher risks  
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and, hence, a need for closer monitoring (Gompers (1995)) or for non-financial support. 
Since informational asymmetries, and thus agency costs, are easier to mitigate and sup-
port activities are easier to conduct in spatial proximity, we anticipate: 
H2a: Likelihood for spatial proximity is higher for portfolio companies in industries 
with higher ratio of intangibles to total assets.  
H2b: Likelihood for spatial proximity is higher for portfolio companies in industries 
with higher ratio of R&D expenses to total assets. 
H2c: Likelihood for spatial proximity is higher for portfolio companies in industries 
with higher market to book ratios. 
Size and experience of the venture capitalist 
Larger venture capital investors are usually able and required to operate within a 
broader geographic scope. They are likely to have a more dispersed network of contacts 
and are more visible in the industry compared to smaller venture capitalists. Therefore, 
they are able to receive comparably more supra-regional deal flow which can imply 
higher geographical distance to their portfolio companies compared to smaller venture 
capitalists (Gupta/Sapienza (1992)). Furthermore, the larger fund size implies that they 
have to include a larger geographic radius in order to find a sufficient number of high 
potential new ventures. Thus, we posit: 
H3: Likelihood for spatial proximity is higher for venture capitalists with lower 
amounts of assets under management. 
In addition to size, the experience of a venture capitalist is also likely to influence the 
size and geographic dispersion of his network (Sorenson/Stuart (2001)). We use age as 
proxy for the experience of a venture capitalist. With increasing age, the venture capital-
ist can build on a growing network of contacts from prior investments. This includes 
contacts to other industry players as well as to other venture capitalists with which syn-
dicated investments were realised. Furthermore, the reputation of more experienced 
venture capitalists is also likely to be higher. More experienced venture capitalists are 
therefore expected to receive more supra-regional deal flow and to be able to support 
their portfolio companies with a larger network of contacts post-investment compared to 
less experienced venture capitalists. On average, this could lead to more distant invest-
ments by more experienced investors (Powell et al. (2002)). However, in addition to the 
spatial structure of the venture capitalist’s network and thus deal flow also the quantity 
and quality of deal flow has to be considered. As has been stated, more experienced 
venture capitalists are expected to have tighter and larger networks, a higher reputation, 
and thus are likely to receive more and potentially better deal flow compared to younger 
industry players. If more experienced venture capitalists have the choice, they might 
focus their efforts on more proximate investment opportunities, since those are easier to  
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assess and easier to manage in the future. In contrast, less experienced venture capital-
ists might be restricted by their deal flow, which forces them to also accept more distant 
investment opportunities in order to build up their network and reputation 
(Cumming/Dai (2007)). 
Therefore, it is unclear whether the likelihood of spatial proximity is higher for 
more or less experienced venture capitalists. Thus, no hypothesis can be formulated. 
Nonetheless, the experience of the venture capitalist could turn out to be a relevant 
variable for the importance of spatial proximity in venture capital investing. 
Specialization of the venture capitalist 
The level of specialization of a venture capitalist is likely to be related to the geographic 
dispersion of portfolio companies. Local markets may not offer sufficient numbers of 
attractive investment targets in a certain industry or development stage. Therefore, ven-
ture capitalists with a high specialization on an industry or stage are likely to be forced 
to include a broader geographic region in their search for attractive investment targets. 
We thus anticipate: 
H4a: Likelihood for spatial proximity is higher for venture capitalists with lower 
specialization in terms of industry.  
H4b: Likelihood for spatial proximity is higher for venture capitalists with lower 
specialization in terms of investment stage. 
Type of venture capitalist 
Corporate venture capitalists are expected to focus their venture capital activities on 
industries related to the industry of their holding company. Therefore, they are likely to 
have a rather narrow industry focus. Furthermore, we assume that the management of 
the investment is conducted by one of the corporate venture capitalist’s branches and 
not by any other branch of the holding company. Thus, in line with the arguments pre-
sented above on diversification, we expect the likelihood of spatial proximity to be 
lower for corporate venture capitalists. 
Semi-profit oriented venture capitalists include venture capital entities from savings 
banks, state-funded venture capitalists and other venture capitalists that do not follow an 
investment strategy focussed solely on financial return (see also Achleitner et al. 
(2009)). Instead, these venture capitalists have in common that they also pursue the ob-
jective to facilitate regional development through their investments. These types of in-
vestors should be located closer to their portfolio companies compared to other venture 
capitalists since their investment activities are constrained to certain regions 
(Gupta/Sapienza (1992); Fritsch/Schilder (2008)). Thus, we hypothesize: 
H5a: Likelihood for spatial proximity is lower for corporate venture capitalists. 
H5b: Likelihood for spatial proximity is higher for semi-profit oriented venture 
capitalists.  
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Investment volume per venture capitalist 
The investment volume of a venture capital deal can influence the likelihood of spatial 
proximity between actors in two opposing directions. On the one hand, the expected 
profit can increase with the size of the investment as transaction costs do not increase in 
the same proportion as the deal size. Consequently, investors might be less reluctant to 
overcome large geographical distances the higher the investment volume (Martin et al. 
(2005); Fritsch/Schilder (2006)). On the other hand, the possibility of venture capital 
funds to diversify their portfolio declines with increasing investment sums per deal. 
This could lead to higher motivation of the venture capitalist for more frequent interac-
tion and support for each single investment in case of a low level of diversification and 
i.e. high investment volumes. It could then be of advantage to be located closer to the 
investment the higher the investment volume. 
Hence, the overall relationship between the likelihood of spatial proximity and the in-
vestment volume is not clear. However, the relative effect of the transaction costs on the 
expected profits decrease with an increasing investment volume while the costs of not 
being able to appropriately diversify the portfolio increase. Therefore we anticipate: 
H6: Likelihood for spatial proximity decreases with larger investment volumes up to 
a certain threshold and increases thereafter. 
Consecutive investment round 
As explained above, informational asymmetries and transaction costs are expected to be 
lower for deals with closer distance between the venture capitalist and the venture. In 
addition, the support through the provision of local contacts is easier. Therefore, it can 
be hypothesized that financing rounds which include venture capital investors and in-
vestees located closer to each other incur less problems compared to financing rounds 
with regionally dispersed actors. In addition, venture capitalists could be more willing 
to finance consecutive financing rounds of ventures close to them as they have build up 
a closer relationship and as value-adding activities in future rounds are easier. Underlin-
ing these arguments, Sapienza/Gupta) (1994) find first empirical evidence that geo-
graphic distance and the venture’s performance are negatively correlated. The likeli-
hood of receiving future financing rounds is then expected to be higher for deals with 
closer spatial proximity between the venture capital investor and the investee. We thus 
posit: 
H7: Likelihood for spatial proximity is higher for consecutive investment rounds by 
the same investor. 
Lead-investor vs. co-investor  
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Lead-investors usually have a key role in a syndicated venture capital deal. They are 
likely to be more involved in trying to mitigate informational asymmetries by support-
ing and monitoring the venture more closely compared to co-investors. Empirical evi-
dence shows that they have more face to face meetings with the management of their 
portfolio companies compared to co-investors (Wright/Lockett (2003)). Furthermore, 
first empirical indications exist that syndication is used as a measure to overcome chal-
lenges of regionally dispersed investments (Fritsch/Schilder (2006)). Therefore, it is 
expected that for lead-investors spatial proximity to the venture is more important than 
for co-investors. Thus, we anticipate: 
H8: Likelihood for spatial proximity is higher for lead-investors. 
H9: Some of the effects of the elaborated hypotheses differ between lead- and co-
investors. 
 
3  Empirical evidence 
3.1  Sample description and methodology 
Our analysis is based on a sample of 950 dyads of venture capitalists and portfolio com-
panies. The dyads include 364 German new ventures that received 504 venture capital 
financing rounds from 187 different venture capital investors between January 2002 and 
March 2007. The data was gathered from the Dow Jones VentureSource database. 
The collected data included the location of all branches of both parties, the portfolio 
companies’ age and industry, the venture capitalists’ size as assets under management, 
age of the venture capitalist, and role as co- or lead-investor, as well as the type, total 
amount raised, and number of investors in the financing round. In total, VentureSource 
reports 756 financing rounds of German ventures in the respective time frame, which 
leads to 1,402 dyads of venture capitalists and portfolio companies. Unfortunately, 452 
dyads had to be excluded due to missing values for certain variables. In most of these 
cases either the amount raised in the financing round, the assets under management or 
the age of the venture capital investor were not provided by VentureSource. 
Dependent variable: Spatial proximity 
In order to analyze spatial proximity between the venture capitalist and the new venture 
this paper is the first that includes a flight option and investigates the minimum travel 
time for each dyad. Various measures of spatial proximity like spherical distance, car 
distance, or car travel time are proposed in the literature (Lerner (1995); 
Sorenson/Stuart (2001); Fritsch/Schilder (2006)). These measures have the common 
weakness of providing very large values for longer distances, especially for interconti-
nental relationships. The long distance does not represent the actual travel time in case a  
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good flight connection exists. In order to represent spatial proximity more realistically, 
one has to estimate the shortest travel time which can be achieved with different means 
of transport including car or air plane. By including a flight option we provide the first 
study that adequately accounts for long distances between the venture capitalist and the 
new venture. We are therefore able to include international and especially intercontinen-
tal relationships in our analysis. We used Google Maps to collect average travel times 
by car between the two parties’ ZIP codes. In case a venture capitalist runs several of-
fices, we assumed that the office located the closest to the new venture is in charge of 
the deal. If the car travel time was greater than three hours, a flight option was investi-
gated. Then the travel time was assumed to be the sum of the car travel time from the 
investor to the closest airport, a check-in time of 60 minutes, the average flight time to 
the airport closest to the venture, a check-out time of 30 minutes and the car travel time 
from the airport to the venture. The appropriate airport was assigned to each venture 
capitalist and portfolio company as follows: First, Germany was divided into 97 areas 
according to the first two digits of the five digit ZIP code. Second, each of the areas was 
assigned to one of the 13 largest German airports. If there was no flight connection be-
tween two airports or if a foreign venture capitalists was involved, the optimal flight con-
nection was investigated manually. Finally, the smaller value of car or flight option was 
used as minimum travel time. In 31,5% of the dyads the flight option was finally used. 
Independent variables      
Development stage of the new venture. The age of the new venture at each financing 
round was provided by VentureSource. Seed, first, second and later stage rounds were 
included in the analysis according to the VentureSource round class definition. 
Industry of the new venture. We use an approach similar to Gompers) (1995) to con-
struct generic industry variables for each new venture because individual accounting 
data of portfolio companies was not available. Annual industry averages for each GICS 
code (Global Industry Classification Standard) were calculated by using all German 
companies listed in the Thomson ONE Banker database. The eight digit GICS code was 
used to form a group. If there were fewer than four companies in a group, the six digit 
GICS group was used instead. In case there were still not enough companies in one 
group, the level was further reduced until at least four companies were in the group. 
Following this procedure, annual industry variables for the asset tangibility (intangibles 
to total assets), research intensity (R&D expenses to total assets), and growth opportuni-
ties (market to book ratio) were calculated. In addition, each new venture in our sample  
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was assigned to an eight digit GICS code according to its VentureSource industry code. 
Finally, the data were matched by date and industry to each financing round. 
Size and experience of the venture capitalist. Assets under management were used as 
proxy for the size of a venture capitalists. For experience, we used age of the venture 
capital firm as proxy. Both of these variables were provided in the VentureSource data-
base. 
Specialization of the venture capitalist. To characterize the portfolio strategy of each 
venture capitalist, we calculate Herfindahl-Hirschman Indices (HHI) to measure the 
specialization across different industries and financing stages (Lossen (2007)). To cal-
culate the HHI the fraction of investment rounds per industry and stage was determined 
for each venture capitalist over the whole sample time period. The respective fractions 
were then squared and summed up. In consequence, a HHI of 1 indicates a very high 
specialization (i.e. a venture capitalist investing in only one industry or stage) and a 
HHI close to 0 indicates a very high diversification. We calculated the HHI only for 
those venture capitalists which participated in at least 3 financing rounds throughout the 
sample period. As categorization of industries, the VentureSource industry segment, 
which entails 16 categories, was used. The VentureSource round class, which comprises 
seed stage, first stage, second stage, and later stage, was used to categorize financing 
stages. 
Type of venture capitalist. We determined the type of venture capitalist by analyzing his 
shareholder structure. Most of the venture capitalists report their shareholder structure to 
the Bundesverband Deutscher Kapitalbeteiligungsgesellschaften (BVK) which pub-
lishes them on their website (www.bvkap.de). In case a venture capitalist was not in-
cluded, a web search was conducted or the venture capitalist was contacted directly. 
Each venture capitalist was categorized in one of the following groups: independent 
venture capitalist (i.e. independent venture capitalists, subsidiaries of financial corpora-
tions, and others), corporate venture capitalists (i.e. subsidiaries of non-financial corpo-
rations), semi-profit venture capitalists (i.e. Mittelständische Beteiligungsgesellschaften 
(MBG), subsidiaries of savings or cooperative banks, state banks, promotional banks, 
and other institutions linked to the German government (see also Achleitner et al. 
(2009)). 
Investment volume per venture capitalist. To test the impact of the investment volume 
on the likelihood of spatial proximity we assume that each venture capitalist contributes 
equally to the total amount raised in a financing round. Thus, the investment volume per  
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venture capitalist is determined by dividing the total amount raised as given in Venture-
Source by the number of participating investors in a financing round. 
Consecutive investment round. A discrete variable indicating the count number of the 
follow on financing round of an investor was generated. 
Lead-investor vs. co-investor. We created a dummy variable for lead investors based on 
the data given in VentureSource. 
Control variables 
To control for further effects influencing spatial proximity between venture capitalists 
and portfolio companies, we also collected several control variables. To account for 
structural differences in the historical and present economic development as well as 
development of the German venture capital industry, a dummy variable was collected 
which entails whether a new venture is located in the former German Democratic Re-
public (GDR). Venture capitalists might also perceive investment opportunities differ-
ently depending on whether the venture is located in an urban or rural area. Therefore, 
data on the annual population density of each German district was collected from the 
GENESIS database of the federal statistical office and included as a dummy variable. 
Further control variables for economic development included total German venture 
capital fundraising in the previous calendar year and total German venture capital in-
vestments in the calendar year of the respective financing round, as well as the discrete 
return of the MSCI Germany Small Cap Index over the last twelve months before the 
respective financing round. These variables were collected from Thomson SDC – Ven-
tureXpert and Datastream. Finally, the venture capitalist’s total number of offices as 
provided by VentureSource was included to control for proximity between both parties 
which is simply induced by multiple offices. 
Methodology 
As can be seen in Figure 1, the minimum travel time as dependent variable is not nor-
mally distributed. First, the minimum travel time is restricted to positive values. Second, 
the distribution exhibits multiple maxima. This is due to the inclusion of the flight op-
tion, which leads to many observations with a minimum travel time between three and 
four and a half hours. In consequence, OLS and even Tobit models are not appropriate 
to analyze the observed spatial proximity (Wooldridge (2008)). However, the minimum 
travel time can sensibly be divided in ordinal categories, which are easy to interpret. 
Thus, we use ordered logit regressions to test our hypotheses. 
Each dyad was assigned to a certain category depending on its minimum travel time. 
The used categories are depicted in Figure 1Error! Reference source not found.. The  
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first category contains all dyads with a minimum travel time from zero to half an hour, 
which represents a very short distance and means that the venture is a taxi ride away. 
The second category (greater than half an hour to one and a half hours) represent rela-
tively short car distances, while the third category (greater than one and a half hours to 
three hours) already contains quite substantial car distances. The forth category (greater 
than three to four hours) mainly contains national and European flight connections as 
well as longer car distances. Finally, the fifth category (greater than four hours) contains 
flight connections and very long car distances. 
Table 1 shows descriptive statistics of relevant variables. Some variables do either have 
a very large skewness or contain some outliers. Whenever it makes economic sense, 
these variables were included with their logarithmic value in our final models. In conse-
quence, the problem of skewness and outliers is alleviated and the impact of these vari-
ables is modelled with a decreasing impact of their absolute variations. 
 
3.2  Empirical results 
An analysis of the correlation matrix, which is shown in Table 2, offers first insights 
into bivariate relationships. As many of the variables are dichotomous or categorical 
Table 2 depicts Kendall’s tau. The correlations of different measures for spatial prox-
imity with characteristics of the venture capitalist, the venture, and the respective fi-
nancing round are fairly small in most cases but reveal several significant bivariate rela-
tionships. 
Table 3 shows the results of the ordered logit regressions. The dependent, ordinal vari-
able contains five categories which were built based on the minimum travel time as de-
scribed above. A higher category number indicates a larger minimum travel time be-
tween the venture capitalist and the new venture. Model OL 1 includes all variables in 
their original linear form. However, for many variables it makes economic sense to in-
clude their logarithm as the relative variation of the respective variable is pivotal. In 
consequence, Model OL 2 includes the logarithm of certain variables if appropriate. 
Model OL 3 replaces the strictly monotonic increasing effect of the investment volume 
by a non-linear effect which allows minima or maxima. Thus a linear and a quadratic 
effect are included jointly. As can be seen in Table 3, Model OL 3 provides a better fit 
to the data as indicated by a higher Nagelkerke's R² of 27.00% and a smaller Akaike 
Information Criterion (AIC). Thus, the following discussion of results will be mainly 
based on Model OL 3. Model OL 4 tests the impact of the venture capitalist’s speciali- 
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zation on the likelihood of spatial proximity. This test was conducted separately as it 
reduces the available sample size to 859. 
In addition, we tested whether there are structural differences between lead- and co-
investors other than the general intercept. Therefore, we ran regressions on different 
subsamples. The results are shown in the Model OL 5. Model OL 5 (Lead-Inv.) includes 
only those dyads in which the respective venture capitalist served as lead-investor and 
Model OL 5 (Co-Inv.) includes the remaining dyads. 
Development stage of the new venture 
The results show that on average younger portfolio companies exhibit more spatial 
proximity to their investors and thus support Hypothesis 1a. Hypothesis 1b, seed rounds 
are usually financed by proximate investors, is not supported as the coefficient is not 
significant. The correlation matrix in Table 2 reveals, that the seed round dummy is 
negatively correlated to the investment volume per venture capitalist and the portfolio 
companies’ age. The coefficients of these variables are significant, which indicates that 
these variables overlay the effect of the seed round dummy on the minimum travel time. 
Overall, Model OL 3 depicts a negative point estimate for the later stage dummy which 
even becomes significant in Model OL 4. These results suggest that later stage rounds 
are financed by venture capitalists with shorter minimum travel times. This is surprising 
and contradicts hypothesis 1c. A closer look at the separate models for lead- and co-
investors reveals, that this effect is mainly driven by co-investors, which are closer to 
their investments in later stage rounds. Lead investors on average tend to exhibit less 
spatial proximity to their later stage investments, even though this effect is not signifi-
cant. We currently do not have an explanation for this effect and further research is re-
quired. 
Industry of the new venture 
Regarding the portfolio companies’ industry, the results indicate that the observed spa-
tial proximity between venture capitalist and portfolio companies with low asset tangi-
bility is higher compared to others. This supports hypothesis 2a. The effects of the ven-
ture’s research intensity (H2b: R&D expenses to total assets) and future growth per-
spectives (H2c: market to book value) are not significant, but the point estimates of the 
coefficients indicate the hypothesized direction. 
Size and experience of the venture capitalist 
All analyzed models clearly show, that larger venture capitalists in terms of assets under 
management have a larger investment radius, since they are under pressure to invest 
their assets. Thus, hypothesis 3 is supported. The effect itself seems to be diminishing  
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the larger the venture capital investor is because the significance level of the logarithm 
of assets under management exhibits a higher significance level compared to the linear 
effect. 
The empirical analysis further reveals that older and thus more experienced venture 
capitalists on average invest in more proximate ventures. In consequence, the effect that 
more experienced venture capitalists are able to choose more proximate investment op-
portunities among a higher quantity and quality of deal flow outweighs the effect of a 
geographically more dispersed network. This is a very interesting result as it could be an 
indication that more experienced venture capitalists are aware of the advantages of spa-
tial proximity and choose ventures in short travel distances. 
Specialization of the venture capitalist 
Model OL 4 indicates that the average minimum travel time increases the higher the 
specialization of venture capitalists is in regard to industry and stage. These results sup-
port hypotheses 4a and 4b and show that investors are willing or forced to give up the 
advantages of spatial proximity in order to follow their specialization strategies. 
Type of venture capitalist 
Hypothesis 5a, corporate venture capitalist are willing to invest in more distant ventures 
due to their primarily strategic interests, is supported by Model OL 3. Moreover, this 
result is robust to the inclusion of the specialisation variables in Model OL 4. 
The results also support hypothesis 5b, which states that semi-profit oriented venture 
capitalists invest in more proximate ventures. As has been stated above, these venture 
capitalists are mainly influenced by public policy or other restrictions, which leads to a 
limitation of their target area on specific regions. 
Investment volume per venture capitalist 
Models OL 2 and 3 provide insights into the impact of the investment volume on the 
likelihood of spatial proximity. As can be seen in Model OL 2 a strictly monotonic in-
creasing effect of the logarithm of the investment volume can not be proved. In unre-
ported regressions we also tested a pure linear effect of the investment volume which is 
also not significant. Thus, a non-linear effect which allows minima or maxima was in-
cluded in Model OL 3. As can be seen in Table 3 a linear and a quadratic effect are 
jointly included and both effects are significantly different from zero. Hence, with in-
creasing investment volume the positive linear effect is more and more offset by the 
negative quadratic effect. This results in an inverted u-shaped relationship and supports 
hypothesis 6. The likelihood of a distant investment increases up to an investment vol-
ume of about 3.5 m€ and decreases thereafter. This is an intriguing result as it implies  
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that for small investments transaction costs outweigh the desire to monitor investments 
more intensively. In contrast, for large investments the need for more close monitoring 
outweighs the relatively lower transaction costs. 
Consecutive investment round 
Consecutive investment rounds by the same venture capitalist are on average closer to 
the investor in terms of minimum travel time which supports hypothesis 7. This result 
indicates that the spatial proximity between both parties is regarded as important in or-
der to continue the relationship. The observed closer proximity of consecutive invest-
ment rounds may have two rationales. Either the involved parties decide not to continue 
distant relationships more often because closer relationships have more advantages. Or 
portfolio companies decide to move their venture closer to typical locations of venture 
capital investors after initial investment rounds because proximity is regarded as success 
factor. As the second rationale seems to be less realistic, the effect may prove the im-
portance of spatial proximity for venture capital investment decisions. 
Lead-investor vs. co-investor 
Hypothesis 8, lead-investors are expected on average to be located more proximate to 
the new ventures compared to co-investors, is also supported by the data (Model OL 3). 
Furthermore, a comparison of the results of the different subsamples of Model OL 5 and 
Model OL 4 indicates that there are also structural differences between lead- and co-
investors. A Chi² difference test whether the models on the divided subsamples provide 
a better fit compared to Model OL 4 is significant at a 10% level. Thus, hypothesis 9 is 
supported. In most cases the difference in the coefficient’s point estimates for lead- and 
co-investors are in line with our hypotheses. Thus, the coefficients for the venture’s age 
and later stage dummy, the venture capitalist’s age and corporate venture capitalist 
dummy, as well as for the investment volume and the consecutive financing round indi-
cate a stronger impact for lead-investors compared to co-investors. In contrast, the ven-
ture capital investor’s size has a greater impact on the average minimum travel time for 
co-investors compared to lead-investors. This implies that co-investors are less reluctant 
to increase their investment radius in order to find a sufficient number of investment 
opportunities compared to lead-investors. Furthermore, specialized venture capital in-
vestors seem to prefer the role of a co-investor if they are investing in more distant ven-
tures as the coefficients for specialization are more pronounced for co-investors. Only 
the coefficients for the venture’s seed round dummy and industry variables as well as 
for the semi-profit oriented venture capitalist dummy show mixed results. Table 4 sum-
marizes the tested hypotheses and the empirical results.  
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3.3  Robustness checks 
Various robustness checks were conducted to verify the empirical results presented 
above. In unreported regressions, multiple alternative category definitions for the de-
pendent variable minimum travel time were tested. Furthermore, alternative model defi-
nitions including smaller sub-models were tested. The main results remained unchanged 
which supports the reported results. In addition, unreported regressions suggest that the 
consideration of a flight option leads to clearer results compared to alternative measures 
of spatial proximity like car travel time or car distance. 
For all presented models we also tested OLS regressions with ln(1 + minimum travel 
time) as dependent variable. The results are presented in Table 5 in the appendix. Most 
results remain unchanged with minor differences in the significance of the coefficients. 
Only the coefficient of the seed round dummy changed its sign, but was not significant. 
Moreover, all models were tested for multicollinearity. The variables of our core Mod-
els OL 1 – 4 revealed only low multicollinearity for most variables. Only the linear and 
quadratic term of the investment volume have moderate to high variance inflation fac-
tors (VIFs) of 6.85 and 6.11 respectively. The VIFs of the other variables are always 
equal or below 3.53. However, the VIFs of the different subsamples of Model OL 5 
indicate fairly high multicollinearity for both terms of the investment volume. Thus, the 
coefficients of these variables have to be interpreted with caution in Model OL 5. The 
VIFs of the other variables are equal or below 3.68 in both subsamples of Model OL 5 
(Wooldridge (2008)). 
Finally, in unreported regressions also Tobit models and multinomial logit regressions 
were tested and suggested that our results are robust. All unreported regressions are avail-
able upon request. 
 
4  Conclusion 
The aim of our paper is to extend the understanding of patterns in spatial proximity in 
venture capital finance in Germany and comparable continental European countries. We 
investigate how the likelihood of spatial proximity relates to different characteristics of 
the new venture, the venture capitalist and the financing round. We use a dataset of 950 
dyads of venture capitalists and German new ventures which closed a financing round 
between January 2002 and March 2007. 
We use ordinal logit regressions to depict patterns in the geographic dispersion of these 
dyads. It is the first study to use the minimum travel time including travel by car and/or  
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plane to estimate spatial proximity as dependent variable realistically and to be able to 
include intercontinental deals. As independent variables, we use characteristics of the 
new venture, the venture capitalist, and the respective financing round. Investigated 
venture characteristics include factors relating to the development stage (age, seed, early 
or later stage) and the industry (generic industry ratios such as intangibles to total assets, 
R&D expenses to total assets, market to book ratios). In regard to the venture capitalist 
its size (assets under management), experience (age), level of specialization (in terms of 
industry, stage), and type (independent venture capitalist, corporate venture capitalists, 
semi-profit oriented venture capitalists) were analyzed. Finally, variables relating to 
other specifics of the financing round (investment volume, consecutive investment 
rounds) were scrutinized. In addition, we investigated differences between lead- and co-
investors in regard to the found relationships. 
Key findings are that younger ventures as well as ventures in knowledge-intensive in-
dustries are likely to be located closer to their venture capitalist. This is in line with 
principal agent theory as these characteristics are an indicator for the level of informa-
tional asymmetries. In line with Kaserer et al.) (2007) and EFI (2009), this fact also sug-
gests that a local investor base is crucial to spur innovation within regions. This has im-
portant implications for policy makers of countries such as Germany which have clus-
ters of venture capitalists in certain regions. It could possibly help to improve regional 
development in deprived areas if a local venture capital market is established through 
institutional settings. 
Later stage deals were not found to be geographically further dispersed which contra-
dicts principal agent theory based arguments. Further research is required to understand 
this phenomenon. In addition, we find that larger venture capitalists are forced to in-
crease their investment radius in order to find a sufficient number of high potential ven-
tures and seem to have a larger network from which to benefit as they are found to real-
ize more geographically dispersed deals.  
Older and thus more experienced venture capitalists exhibit shorter distances to their 
portfolio companies in our sample. This implies that they are able to benefit from their 
higher quantity and quality of deal flow and are able to choose more proximate deals 
compared to their younger counterparts. Venture capitalists with a high degree of spe-
cialization in terms of industry or stage were found to realize deals with less spatial 
proximity. Thus, also corporate venture capitalists on average invest in more distant 
new ventures. As expected, semi-profit oriented venture capitalists in our sample were 
focussed on local new ventures in their investment strategy.   
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In regard to the investment volume, an inverted u-shaped relationship exists. Up to an 
investment volume of about 3.5 m€ investors are willing to increase their investment 
radius as the relative importance of transaction costs declines. However, for investment 
volumes larger than about 3.5 m€ the desire to monitor larger investments more inten-
sively outweighs the advantage of a reduced relative impact of transaction costs. Fi-
nally, lead investors were found to be located closer to their portfolio companies in gen-
eral and we found that the findings described above are even more pronounced for lead-
investors than for co-investors. 
An important limitation of our study is the problem of causality. Spatial proximity is not 
a pure endogenous variable but is likely to impact the investment decision. Venture 
capitalists and/or new ventures are likely to base their decision to close a deal also on 
the geographical distance between them. This effect then determines the composition of 
our sample of venture capital financing rounds and causes the relationships that we ex-
plored in our study. In consequence, our results can not be interpreted as causal relation-
ships but have to be interpreted as correlations. Future studies could tackle this problem 
by modelling spatial proximity in conjecture with other decisive factors as a variable 
impacting the likelihood that a venture capital financing round will take place to shed 
further light on this issue. 
Overall, our results indicate that the patterns in spatial proximity in venture capital fi-
nance are shaped by a broad combination of characteristics of the new venture, the ven-
ture capitalist and the financing round. In finding patterns in the geographic dispersion 
of German venture capital deals, we are able to show that the relevance of spatial prox-
imity seems to differ systematically for certain types of new ventures, venture capitalists 
and deals. This gives an important indication that spatial proximity is in fact an invest-
ment decision factor contradicting the findings of Fritsch/Schilder (2008). Our study 
leads to important implications for entrepreneurial teams, venture capitalists and policy 
makers alike as the results give indications for what type of venture capital deals spatial 
proximity seems to be particularly relevant and, hence, a vital, locally established ven-
ture capital market appears to be more important. 
5  References 
Achleitner, Ann-Kristin, Marko Bender, Reiner Braun and Annabell Geidner (2009), 
Community Development Venture Capital: Concept and Status Quo in Ger-
many, International Journal of Entrepreneurship and Innovation Management 
9, 437-452. 
Audretsch, David B. and Maryann P. Feldman (1996), R&D Spillovers and the Geogra-
phy of Innovation and Production, The American Economic Review 86, 630-640.  
  22
Blau, Peter Michael (1977), Inequality and heterogeneity – A primitive theory of social 
structure, New York: Free Press. 
Cumming, Douglas J. and Na Dai (2007), Local Bias in Venture Capital Investments, 
Working Paper, York University, University of New Mexico. 
Cumming, Douglas and Sofia A. Johan (2006), Provincial Preferences in Private Equity, 
Financial Market Research 20, 369–398. 
Expertenkommission Forschung und Innovation (EFI) (2009), Gutachten zu Forschung, 
Innovation und technologischer Leistungsfähigkeit 2009, Berlin: EFI. 
Florida, Richard L. and Martin Kenney (1988), Venture Capital, High Technology and 
Regional Development, Regional Studies 22, 3-48. 
Fritsch, Michael and Dirk Schilder (2006), Is Venture Capital a Regional Business? – 
The Role of Syndication, Freiberg Working Papers 09-2006, TU Freiberg. 
Fritsch, Michael and Dirk Schilder (2008), Does Venture Capital investment really re-
quire spatial proximity? An empirical investigation, Environment and Planning 
A 40, 2114-2131. 
Gompers, Paul A. (1995), Optimal Investment, Monitoring, and the Staging of Venture 
Capital, Journal of Finance 50, 1461-1489. 
Gupta, Anil K. and Harry J. Sapienza (1992), Determinants of Venture Capital Firms’ 
Preferences Regarding the Industry Diversity and Geographic Scope of their In-
vestments, Journal of Business Venturing 7, 347-362. 
Hellmann, Thomas and Manju Puri (2002), Venture Capital and the Professionalization 
of Start-Up Firms: Empirical Evidence, Journal of Finance 57, 169-197. 
Jaffe, Adam B. (1986), Technological Opportunity and Spillovers of R&D: Evidence 
from Firms' Patents, Profits, and Market Values, American Economic Review 76, 
984-1001. 
Jensen, Michael and William Meckling (1976), Theory of the firm: managerial behav-
ior, agency costs and ownership structure, Journal of Financial Economics 3, 
305-360. 
Kaplan, Steven N. and Per Strömberg (2001), Venture Capitalists as Principals: Con-
tracting, Screening, and Monitoring, The American Economic Review 91, 426-
430. 
Kaplan, Steven N. and Per Strömberg (2003), Financial Contracting Theory Meets the 
Real World: An Empirical Analysis of Venture Capital Contracts, Review of 
Economic Studies 70, 281-315. 
Kaserer, Christoph, Ann-Kristin Achleitner, Christoph von Einem, Dirk Schiereck, 
Markus Ampenberger, Marko Bender, Ines Buermeyer, Annabell Geidner, 
Henry Lahr, Mark Mietzner and Eva Nathusius (2007), Private Equity in 
Deutschland – Rahmenbedingungen, ökonomische Bedeutung und Hand-
lungsempfehlungen, Norderstedt: Books on Demand. 
Kortum, Samuel and Josh Lerner (2000), Assessing the Contribution of Venture Capital 
to Innovation, Rand Journal of Economics 31, 674-692. 
Lerner, Joshua (1995), Venture capitalists and the oversight of private firms, Journal of 
Finance 50, 301-318. 
Lossen, Ulrich (2007), Portfolio Strategies of Private Equity Firms – Theory and Evi-
dence, München: Ludwig Maximilians Universität 
Martin, Ron, Christian Berndt, Britta Klagge and Peter Sunley (2005), Spatial proximity 
effects and regional equity gaps in the venture capital market: Evidence from 
Germany and the United Kingdom, Environment and Planning 37, 1207-1231. 
Martin, Ron, Peter Sunley and Dave Turner (2002), Taking risks in regions: the geo-
graphical anatomy of Europe's emerging venture capital market, Journal of Eco-
nomic Geography 2, 121-150. 
Mason, Colin (1992), New Firm Formation and Growth, in Martin, R. and P. Townroe 
(ed.), Regional Policy and Development 4: Regional development in the 1990s,  
  23
London: Regional Studies Association and Jessica Kingsley Publishers,  150-
160. 
Mason, Colin M. and Richard T. Harrison (2002), The Geography of Venture Capital 
Investments in the UK, Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers 27, 
427-452. 
McPherson, Miller, Lynn Smith-Lovin and James M. Cook (2001), Birds of a Feather: 
Homophily in Social Networks, Annual Review of Sociology 27, 415-444. 
Myers, Stewart (1977), Determinants of corporate borrowing, Journal of Financial 
Economics 5, 147-175. 
Powell, Walter W., Kenneth W. Koput, James I. Bowie and Laurel Smith-Doerrs 
(2002), The Spatial Clustering of Science and Capital: Accounting for Biotech 
Firm-Venture Capital Relationships, Regional Studies 36, 291-205. 
Samila, Sampsa and Olav Sorenson (2008), Venture Capital, Entrepreneurship, and Re-
gional Economic Growth, Working Paper, Brock University, University of To-
ronto. 
Sapienza, Harry J. (1992), When do venture capitalists add value?, Journal of Business 
Venturing 7, 9-27. 
Sapienza, Harry J. and Dirk De Clercq (2000), Venture Capitalist-Entrepreneur Rela-
tionships in Technology-Based Ventures, Enterprise & Innovation Management 
Studies 1, 57-71. 
Sapienza, Harry J. and Atul Gupta (1994), Impact of agency risks and task uncertainty 
on venture capitalist-CEO interaction, Academy of Management Journal 37, 
1618-1632. 
Shleifer, Andrei and Robert W. Vishny (1992), Liquidation Values and Debt Capacity: 
A Market Equilibrium Approach, Journal of Finance 47, 1343-1366. 
Sorenson, Olav and Tobi E. Stuart (2001), Syndication Networks and the Spatial Distri-
bution of Venture Capital Investments, American Journal of Sociology 106, 
1546-1588. 
Thibaut, John W. and Harold H. Kelley (1959), The social psychology of groups, New 
York: Wiley. 
Williamson, Oliver E. (1981), The Economics of Organization: The Transaction Cost 
Approach, American Journal of Sociology 87, 548-577. 
Williamson, Oliver E. (1988), Corporate Finance and Corporate Governance, Journal of 
Finance 43, 567-591. 
Wooldridge, Jeffrey M. (2008), Introductory econometrics: A modern approach, Ma-
son, OH: South-Western. 
Wright, Mike and Andy Lockett (2003), The Structure and Management of Alliances: 
Syndication in Venture Capital Industry Journal of Management Studies 40, 
2073-2102. 
Wright, Mike and Ken Robbie (1998), Venture capital and private equity: A review and 
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics 
This table reports descriptive statistics for the variables used in our multivariate tests. The sample consists of 950 
dyads of venture capitalists and German portfolio companies which have closed a financing round between Jan-
uary 2002 and March 2007. 
Variable n Mean Median S.D. Min Max
Proximity / Distance
Ordinal min. travel time (5 cat.) 950 2.75 3.00 1.42 1.00 5.00
Min. travel time (min.) 950 132.93 114.50 133.74 0.00 1,166.00
Car travel time (min.) 930 163.16 109.00 169.86 0.00 997.00
Car Distance (km) 950 438.92 194.00 1,142.86 0.00 9,672.00
Venture
Age (years) 950 4.54 4.00 3.46 0.01 23.56
Dummy seed stage round 950 0.03 0.00 0.17 0.00 1.00
Dummy early stage round 950 0.58 1.00 0.49 0.00 1.00
Dummy later stage round 950 0.39 0.00 0.49 0.00 1.00
Intangibles to total assets 950 0.17 0.15 0.06 0.00 0.34
R&D exp. to total assets 950 0.13 0.11 0.09 0.00 0.33
Market to book 950 2.80 2.05 3.86 -16.32 25.87
Venture capitalist
Assets under management (m€) 950 1,280.35 124.90 3,680.39 2.00 38,766.54
Age (years) 950 11.11 6.28 13.68 0.10 61.65
HHI industry 859 0.43 0.33 0.23 0.19 1.00
HHI stage 859 0.42 0.39 0.13 0.26 1.00
Dummy independent VC 950 0.75 1.00 0.43 0.00 1.00
Dummy corporate VC 950 0.06 0.00 0.23 0.00 1.00
Dummy semi-profit VC 950 0.19 0.00 0.39 0.00 1.00
Dummy lead-investor 950 0.35 0.00 0.48 0.00 1.00
Round
Investment volume per VC (m€) 950 1.68 1.23 1.42 0.01 11.00




Table 2: Correlation matrix 
This table presents the correlation coefficients based on Kendall’s tau between the variables used for our multi-
variate tests. The sample consists of 950 dyads of venture capitalists and German portfolio companies which 





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 3: Ordered logit regressions 
This table presents the results of ordered logit regressions with ordinal categories of the minimum travel time as 
dependant variable. The sample consists of 950 dyads of venture capitalists and German portfolio companies 
which have closed a financing round between January 2002 and March 2007. Smaller sample sizes in some 
models are due to missing values. HHI: Herfindahl-Hirschman Index; *, **, ***: significant at the 10%, 5%, and 


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































H1a: Age + supported
H1b: Seed round - n.s.
H1c: Later stage round + significant in opposite direction
Industry
H2a: Intangibles to total assets - supported
H2b: R&D expenses to total assets - n.s.
H2c: Market to book ratios - n.s.
H3: Assets under management + supported
Effect of age open significant negative effect
Specialization
H4a: Industry + supported
H4b: Stage + supported
Type
H5a: Corporate VC + supported
H5b: Semi-profit oriented VC - supported
H6: Investment volume per VC inverted u-shaped effect supported
H7: Consecutive round - supported
H8: Lead-investor - supported
H9: Lead-  vs. co-investor different effects for
lead- and co-investors
supported











Table 5: Ordinary least squares regressions 
This table presents the results of ordinary least squares regressions with the minimum travel time (in natural 
logarithm) as dependant variable. The sample consists of 950 dyads of venture capitalists and German portfolio 
companies which have closed a financing round between January 2002 and March 2007. Smaller sample sizes in 
some models are due to missing values. HHI: Herfindahl-Hirschman Index; *, **, ***: significant at the 10%, 
5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
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